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Abstract 
We develop a method for eco-efficiency analysis of consumer durables by utilizing Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). In contrast to previous product efficiency studies, we consider the 
measurement problem from the perspective of a policy maker. The novel innovation of the paper 
is to measure efficiency in terms of absolute shadow prices that are optimized endogenously 
within the model to maximize efficiency of the good. Thus, the efficiency measure has a direct 
economic interpretation as a monetary loss due to inefficiency, expressed in some currency unit. 
The advantages as well as technical differences between the proposed approach and the 
traditional production-side methods are discussed in detail. We illustrate the approach by an 
application to eco-efficiency evaluation of Sport Utility Vehicles.  
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1. Introduction 
The use of consumer durables such as automobiles or washing machines generates multiple 
economic benefits and costs to consumers. In addition to these economic impacts, most consumer 
durables also cause pressures on the ecosystem. In fact, even nearly identical products (let alone 
differentiated ones) can differ considerably from one another with respect to their environmental 
burden. Eco-efficiency of a consumer durable refers to the capability to produce net economic 
benefits by polluting the environment and using natural resources and energy as little as possible. 
In other words, the more economic benefits or services a certain product can produce for given 
economic and environmental costs, the more eco-efficient it is and the more economic value it 
can create for consumers. Therefore, eco-efficiency evaluation provides transparent and valuable 
information for consumer choice and can further assist in purchasing decisions. Moreover, 
manufacturers also need information about the trade-offs between economic benefits and 
environmental pressures that certain consumer durables generate in their use phase.   
In practice, environmental pressures occur throughout the product’s life-cycle, including the 
production, use, and disposal phases. It is, however, very difficult to reliably measure the 
environmental burden that a single product generates in its production or disposal stages. Today, 
the manufacture of an even simple product requires a vast number of different material inputs, 
energy, machinery and tools, as well as transportation services, which all cause environmental 
pressures that are difficult (or even impossible) to attribute to any single product. Likewise, it is 
difficult to attribute the environmental pressures from waste treatment (e.g. land filling or 
incineration) to a single product: it is hard to anticipate how completely the product is disposed 
after use and to what extent recycling possibilities are utilized. Moreover, the environmental 
pressure of disposal does not only depend on the total mass of the product, but also on the 
materials it contains, and on the applied waste treatment technique.
1 By contrast, environmental 
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pressures generated in use can be measured more reliably. Furthermore, most of the pollutants 
and emissions by consumer durables are, in fact, generated during the use phase. This phase is 
also the most essential one from the consumer’s perspective. Due to these reasons we concentrate 
on measuring eco-efficiency of consumer durables in the use phase, and leave production and 
disposal phases outside the discussion. It is, however, worth pointing out that the other phases are 
also important. In any case, when hereafter speaking of eco-efficiency, for simplicity, we 
explicitly refer to eco-efficiency in the use phase. 
To assess the performance or eco-efficiency of consumer durables, it is natural to consider a 
consumer durable as a production unit that demands inputs (such as energy) to produce outputs 
(desirable services and undesirable environmental effects).
2 Adopting this perspective enables us 
to apply the traditional production theory and the sophisticated quantitative methods of efficiency 
analysis developed therein. In particular, we draw insights from the activity analysis (Koopmans, 
1951) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA: Farrell, 1957; Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978) 
approaches, which are widely used nonparametric methods, particularly developed for 
comparative performance assessment.
3 These approaches do not require arbitrary prior 
specification of weights and can also take different kinds of economic impacts into consideration.  
Activity analysis and DEA have been applied to the measurement of environmental 
efficiency or eco-efficiency in numerous studies (see e.g. Färe et al., 1989; Färe, Grosskopf and 
Tyteca, 1996; Tyteca, 1996; Kuosmanen and Kortelainen, 2005; and references therein). 
However, these studies focus exclusively on the production process, while eco-efficiency of the 
final products has been neglected in this literature so far. On the other hand, the earlier studies 
that use DEA for the evaluation of consumer durables tend to assess product characteristics from 
an engineering or marketing perspective, paying little, if any, attention to environmental 
sustainability (see e.g. Doyle and Green, 1991, 1994; Odeck and Hjalmarsson, 1996; Fernandez-
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Castro and Smith, 2002 and Staat, Bauer and Hammerschmidt, 2002). In these studies, products 
are usually regarded as production units that use some inputs (costs) to produce some outputs 
(services), while their burden on the ecosystem has been left aside.  
In this paper, we consider a combination of these two approaches: we develop a general 
method for measuring eco-efficiency of consumer durables during their use phase. While we 
draw influence from earlier activity analysis and DEA approaches in the contexts of production 
analysis and product evaluation, our approach diverges from these in many important respects. 
The main difference to the earlier approaches is that we take a policy maker perspective to the 
measurement problem, while preserving the production theoretic view of the consumer durable as 
a production unit that produces services for the consumer. This view leads us to explore new 
technical solutions (which will be discussed in more detail in Sections 3 and 4).  
Perhaps the most novel innovation of this paper is to measure eco-efficiency by using 
absolute prices. By absolute prices we mean prices that are expressed in terms of some well-
defined unit of measurement (e.g. €/kg), whereas relative prices refer to normalized prices or 
weights that are not anchored in any currency. It should be emphasized that, in our analysis, the 
prices are not given a priori but are endogenously determined within our model, like the usual 
shadow prices in DEA. To our knowledge, only Womer et al. (2003) have earlier considered a 
DEA with absolute-scale shadow prices; yet the rationale behind their method is very different 
from that of the present paper.
4 One advantage of using absolute rather than relative prices is that 
our efficiency measure has a direct economic interpretation as a monetary loss due to 
inefficiency, expressed in the chosen currency (e.g. €). Also the interpretation of shadow prices 
becomes more obvious, as one can relate to those to prices observed in the real markets. This also 
makes it easier to impose restrictions on the feasible range of prices. To show how the approach 
can be used in practice, we apply it to eco-efficiency assessment of automobiles. 
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The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 presents our general setting for 
evaluation of consumer durables. In Section 3, we present the absolute shadow price method for 
eco-efficiency measurement. Section 4 presents the dual problem and compares the technical 
differences between the proposed approach and the traditional production-side methods. Section 
5 consider certain extensions and modifications to absolute shadow price approach. After this, 
Section 6 applies the presented methodology to the measurement of eco-efficiency of Sport 
Utility Vehicles (SUVs). Finally, Section 7 presents the concluding remarks.  
 
2. The Setting 
2.1. Environmental Pressures versus Undesirable Outputs 
This section presents the general setting of efficiency analysis of consumer durables. We avoid 
unnecessary formalism and focus on verbal explanation. Some formal notation will be introduced 
for the purposes of the subsequent sections. Before presenting main ideas, the notion of 
“environmental pressure” requires detailed explanation.     
One important difference to the earlier environmental performance studies in the DEA 
literature is that we focus on environmental pressures rather than specific undesirable outputs (or 
pollutants) per se. Undesirable outputs usually refer to different kinds of undesirable side-
products and side-effects of production, which include, for example, the generation of (non-
recycled) solid waste, emission of substances to air and water and non-material side-effects such 
as noise. Each undesirable output include only one individual pollutant or emission (such as CO2 
or SO2), whereas environmental pressure refers to a broader environmental theme that is 
influenced by multiple pollutants contributing to the same environmental problem. For example, 
production (or product) could generate two different undesirable outputs: carbon-dioxide (CO2) 
and methane (CH4), which contribute to the same environmental problem, the green house effect. 
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Numerous studies have investigated the effects of different green house gases, and scientifically 
sound conversion factors are available for translating the amounts of different green house gases 
into carbon-dioxide equivalents.  
Besides greenhouse gases it is often possible and meaningful to aggregate individual 
pollutants that contribute to the same environmental theme in a single overall measure for a 
specific environmental pressure using conversion factors from impact assessment studies. By 
contrast, different themes tend to be incommensurable, meaning that aggregate-level pressures 
cannot be further added up by using some scientifically sound conversion factors. In the life-
cycle analysis literature, different environmental themes such as climate change are usually called 
environmental impact categories, although these categories only refer to potential impacts, not 
true impacts. For example, aggregated carbon-dioxide equivalents do not adequately capture the 
true environmental impact, measured by the social costs of climate change, but represent only the 
burden on the ecosystem.
5 The relationship between the environmental pressure and the true 
environmental impact is often complex, nonlinear, and difficult to predict. Moreover, it seems 
practically impossible to attribute the effects of climate change (such as loss of life due to heavy 
storms or flooding) to specific firms, not to even speak of a certain product. Therefore, we do not 
attempt to measure the ultimate environmental impacts, but find it most appropriate to work at 
the level of environmental pressures.
6  
{Table 1 around here} 
Table 1 further illustrates the relationship between undesirable outputs and environmental 
pressures in the context of automobiles (see Section 5 for further discussion). The first column of 
Table 1 lists the main undesirable outputs emitted to the environment while driving a car. The 
second column indicates the environmental pressures caused by the specific group of outputs. 
Some environmental pressures (e.g. smog formation) are caused by a single undesirable output, 
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while climate change and acidification are influenced by several alternative pollutants. Some 
harmful substances may even contribute to several environmental pressures, although this is not 
the case in Table 1.
7 To assess a given environmental theme, different pollutants affecting the 
same environmental pressure can usually be aggregated based on their relative damage impact, as 
discussed above By contrast, there is no unambiguous way to summarize all the different 
pressures into a single overall environmental damage index. For example, we cannot simply add 
green-house gases measured in CO2 equivalents to particle emissions measured in tons of TPM. 
While this example pertains to the case of road transportation, which in industrialized countries is 
one of the main sources of air emissions, the similar type of aggregation possibilities and 
problems are faced equally well in other industries and at all levels of aggregation. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Setting 
Having explained the meaning of environmental pressures, we are ready to present our theoretical 
setting. Suppose there are N alternative (comparable) models of the consumer durable available 
for the consumers. Use of consumer durables typically offers private economic benefits and costs 
for the consumer and external environmental costs for the society. As a consequence, it is 
sensible to consider the measurement problem from the perspective of a policy maker who 
evaluates consumer durables for regulatory purposes, but also takes the private net benefits into 
account. However, the specific definition of the policy maker, or the distinction between private 
and social net benefits, will be immaterial for the purposes of the DEA approach to be presented 
below.  
To assess eco-efficiency of a product, we need to account for both private net economic 
benefits and external social costs that arise during the use phase of the product’s life-cycle.   
However, since the duration of the use phase is difficult to predict, we find it most meaningful to 
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analyze the economic benefits and costs and the environmental pressures associated with a single 
run or performance of a consumer durable. For example, in the case of washing machines, it 
would be reasonable to measure environmental pressures and economic benefits and costs per 
one washing time.   
Suppose the use of these N consumer durables generates L different desirable services to 
consumers, as well as M environmental pressures to the environment. Since economic costs are 
usually easy to calculate, we assume that the total marginal cost per one performance, denoted by 
Ck (k = 1,…, N), is known. We also assume that both services and environmental pressures can be 
quantified unambiguously. The services provided by consumer durable k in a single performance 
are represented numerically by vector  ( 1,, kk k L YY ) ′ = Y … and the associated environmental 
pressures by vector  ( 1,, kk k M ZZ ) ′ = Z … , respectively.  
We propose to approach the policy maker’s evaluation problem from the perspective of 
Pareto efficiency, asking whether the use of a particular consumer durable is Pareto efficient from 
the social point of view. Suppose the external environmental effects could be “internalized”, for 
example by creating markets for transferable emission permits, so that the consumer who uses the 
good has to pay the social cost of environmental damage in addition to the use cost.
8 In such a 
hypothetical case, the free markets offer an effective mechanism for pricing the services Y and 
the environmental pressures Z, taking into account both consumer preferences and the firms’ 
production possibilities, resulting in a Pareto efficient allocation. This result is known as the first 
fundamental theorem of welfare economics.
9 Conversely, if any allocation is Pareto efficient, 
irrespective of how efficiency is achieved, then there must exists a set of prices, called 
“efficiency prices” by Koopmans (1951), at which no consumer or firm is willing to trade goods 
in the market. This result is known as the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics.
10 
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Note that the efficiency prices need not result as an outcome of perfectly competitive markets, 
but the efficiency prices might be equally well determined by a social planner (consider e.g. an 
emission tax). Moreover, note that the prices of the attributes Y and Z need not be explicitly 
listed on the market place, but may be implicitly represented in the price of the non-homogenous 
goods. If individual’s utility is a function of the attributes Y and Z, as in Lancaster’s (1966) 
theory of consumer choice, then Pareto efficiency requires existence of efficiency prices for the 
attributes. Indeed, there exists a vast literature on hedonic estimation that focuses on recovering 
such attribute prices from the empirical market data.    
  Suppose for a moment that a unique set of efficiency prices exist, which are represented by 
vector   for services Y and by vector  ( 1,..., ′ = L PP P ) ) ( 1,..., ′ = M UU U for the environmental 
pressures, respectively. The social value added created by a single performance of consumer 
durable k can be measured by 
 (1)  ,  ′′ ≡− − kk k VA C PY UZ k
where the first term   represents the gross economic value of one performance of consumer 
durable k, the second term represents the economic cost, and the last term represents the social 
cost of the additional environmental pressure expressed in money, respectively. Since all 
efficiency prices are expressed in monetary terms, the total VA
′
k PY
k is also measured in money.  
In this study we do not try to impose or estimate any efficiency prices. Efficiency prices 
would depend on the initial allocation of resources and emission permits in the free market, or the 
social planner’s perception of what is good for the society (i.e., the social welfare function). In 
the spirit of Pareto and Koopmans, we call a consumer durable efficient if there exists a set of 
non-negative efficiency prices at which the evaluated good would be adopted in use. In other 
words, we test if any society, irrespective of individuals’ preferences, would find it Pareto 
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optimal to use the evaluated good. For transparency, we shall refer to the ”true” efficiency prices 
by capital symbols P, U, and reserve the lower case symbols pk and uk for the model variables 
that show the performance of good k in the most favorable light.   
 
3. DEA Approach Using Absolute Shadow Prices 
The previous section presented the theoretical setting and showed how value added scores can be 
calculated with the help of efficiency prices. As our purpose is not to estimate efficiency prices, 
but find the most optimal prices and efficiency scores, we consider Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) (Farrell, 1957; Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978) as the most suitable method for 
estimation. This is because DEA seeks optimal shadow prices that present every consumer 
durable in the most favorable light compared to other products. On the other hand, as prices are 
optimized endogenously within the model, the method does not require any a priori arbitrary 
assumption as on how to set these prices. In this context this property is very important, because 
we do not typically have any information about the prices of environmental pressures.  
The key idea of our approach is to test whether there are any nonnegative efficiency prices 
at which consumer durable k is efficient. In order to be socially efficient, product k needs to fulfill 
the following two conditions. 
 
1) Inactivity condition: the value added for the consumer durable has to be nonnegative at optimal 
prices. Formally, there must exist prices   such that  , kk ≥ pu 0 0 kk k kk C − −≥ pY uZ .  
2)  Optimality: the consumer durable must be the optimal choice at some efficiency prices. 
Formally, there must exist prices   such that the inequality   , kk ≥ pu 0
(2)     ( ) ( ) 0 pY uZ pY uZ kk k kk kn n kn CC −− − −− ≥
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is satisfied  .   for all  1,..., . nN ∈
 
The rationale behind the inactivity condition is that the consumers can be inactive, and not 
purchase any of the goods if the costs outweigh the benefits. At minimum, we require that the 
private net economic benefit (i.e., term  kk k C − pY ) of the evaluated good must be positive at the 
optimal prices, otherwise no consumer will buy the product. Prices for environmental pressures 
reflect the unknown external social cost, and they may be zero or positive.  
To test these conditions, we can impose inactivity condition as a price constraint, and 
maximize the minimum value of differences (2) of the optimality condition. That is, we impose 
the inactivity constraint for all testable goods (i.e. for both inefficient and efficient products), 
whereas the optimality condition holds only for the efficient goods. Focusing on consumer 























The first N linear constraints in (3) compare in pair-wise fashion the value added of good k 
relative to all goods in the sample, calculated using the shadow prices. The constraint is binding 
only for the best product in the reference group. Therefore efficiency score EEk can be interpreted 
as a difference between value added score of consumer durable k and the score of the best 
product in the reference group at the given prices. The solution of (3) gives both shadow prices 
pk*, uk*  and the optimal efficiency score EEk* for consumer durable k. Further, since the 
efficiency score is calculated by using the most favorable prices, we can interpret a given 
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efficiency score EEk* as an upper bound for the true efficiency in a single performance of the 
evaluated good.  
Practically, efficiency score EEk* indicates the minimum monetary loss that the usage of 
one service of consumer durable k can offer compared to the best alternative. Note that if the best 
product in the reference group at the given prices is the evaluated consumer durable itself, then 
that product is given efficiency score of zero and is qualified as efficient. If the optimal solution 
EEk* to problem (3) is negative, this means that product k cannot be socially optimal at any non-
negative prices for outputs and environmental pressures. Whatever the efficiency prices might be, 
there exists another good – or a combination thereof - that yields a higher social value added. 
Hence, consumer goods with negative efficiency scores can be regarded as inefficient.  
To classify a good as eco-efficient, we also require that the shadow price of at least one 
environmental pressure must be positive. Using the efficiency measures and the shadow prices, 
we may classify the goods in following categories:  
1)  Efficient goods 
1a. Eco-efficient goods: EEk* =0 such that 
*
k ∃ ≠ u0 .  
1b. Weakly efficient, economical goods: EEk* =0 only for 
*
k = u0 .  
2)  Inefficient goods 
2a. Inefficient, but environmentally friendly goods: EEk* <0 and  .   
*
k ≠ u0
2b. Inefficient, environmentally harmful goods: EEk* <0 and  . 
*
k = u0
Group 1) includes commodities that can be efficient in use. The group 1a consists of eco-
efficient goods, while goods in group 1b are efficient only because of their relatively low 
operating costs. Note that the optimal shadow prices pk*, uk* obtained from (3) for an efficient 
good (group 1) are usually not unique. Therefore, one should test for the uniqueness of the 
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shadow prices when EEk* =0 and 
*
k = u0 . If the evaluated product is efficient only when 
*
k = u0 , 
it belongs to group 1b (i.e. weakly efficient goods). Instead, if the evaluated product is efficient 




k ≠ u0 , the product is classified to group 1a. Note that within 
this group, we could further separate the products that are efficient only under   from the 
products than can be efficient both under positive and zero environmental prices. A more detailed 
classification of group 1a could also take into account the environmental themes in which the 
good has positive shadow price. Environmental policy measures (e.g. green taxes or subsidies) 
could be implemented to increase the market share of group 1a relative to group 1b.  
*
k ≠ u0
Group 2) consists of goods that are inefficient in use from the social point of view. These 
goods may appeal to consumers with a low retail price. By green taxes or subsidies, the 
government may discourage the consumption of goods in group 2b. Supporting consumption of 
goods in group 2a with direct policy measures is inefficient from social point of view. However, 
indirect policy measures that influence the use costs C could help to upgrade some goods from 
group 2a to 1a.   
We will illustrate the efficiency classification by a simple numerical example below. But to 
gain more insight, let us first consider the dual problem of (3).  
 
4. Dual formulation 
Our value added based efficiency measure was formulated in the difference form, with money as 
the unit of measurement, analogous to Nerlove’s (1965) profit efficiency measure. This 
observation presents an immediate link to the directional distance function frequently used in the 
environmental performance analysis: the directional distance function has a dual formulation as 
profit efficiency at the normalized prices (Chambers, Chung and Färe, 1998).  
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To clarify the relationship between the absolute shadow price approach and the directional 
distance function, we next present the dual problem of (3). Introducing vector  1 ( ... ) N CC′ = C , and 
matrices   and  1 (. . . ) N ′ = YY Y
 
1 ( ... ) N ′ = ZZ Z
 
, we can write this dual problem as:
11
(4)  { }
, min  (1+ )   (1 ) ;   (1 ) ;   1;   ;   0 kkk C
θ θθθ −≥ + ≤ + = ≥
λ λC λYY λZZ λ1 λ 0 θ ≥
   
. 
Variable θ  represents the shadow price of the inactivity constraint   of the 
primal problem (3). This variable enables upward scaling of the values of the evaluated 
commodity k. As far as the reference technology is concerned, an upward scaling of the evaluated 
commodity is equivalent to a downward scaling of the intensity weights  . Therefore, an 
efficient commodity must lie on the boundary of the non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS) 
reference technology. However, the scaling also influences the efficiency measure. Therefore, 
problem (4) is not merely a special case of the NIRS DEA model, as we will show next.   
0 kk k kk C −− ≥ pY uZ
λ
Note first that excluding the inactivity constraint from the primal would correspond to 
setting  0 θ = , in which case the dual problem would simplify to    
(5)  { }
, max    ; ; ;  1 ;  ;  0 kk k C
δ δδ δ −= ≥ ≤ = ≥ ≥
λ λC λYYλZZλ1 λ 0
   
. 
This expression be interpreted as the directional distance function, with direction vector 
(,,)( 1 , , ) C g = YZ gg 00, evaluated with respect to a variable returns to scale DEA technology. 
Comparison of problems (4) and (5) reveals the unique character of the inactivity constraint. To 
gain further intuition, we can re-express (4) in the directional distance function form. Let us 
normalize the intensity weights by denoting  /(1 ) θ = + κλ . This allows us to write (4) as 
(6)  { }
, max    ( ) ; ; ;  ;  0 , kk k C
δ δδ δ −= ≥ ≤≥ ≥
κ κ1 κC κYYκZZκ 0
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which resembles the directional distance function with the direction vector 
, evaluated with respect to a constant returns to scale DEA technology. 
However, the difficulty of this interpretation is that the direction vector is not an ex ante given 
constant: the norm of the direction vector depends on the sum of the intensity weights. Thus, we 
conclude that our approach does not reduce to a special case of the directional distance function 
or any other formulation proposed in the literature.  
(,,)(, , ) CYZ g = gg κ100
Let us now illustrate the efficiency classification by a simple numerical example involving 
five goods and a single output, a single environmental pressure and total cost variable. The data 
for these products are reported by Table 2. The example is further illustrated graphically by 
means of an isoquant map in Figure 1. The vertical axis represents the quantity of environmental 
pressure and the horizontal axis the total costs. Points A-E indicate the costs and environmental 
pressure of the corresponding good. Triangles OAB and ABC represent the efficient frontier of 
the NIRS reference technology, as seen from above from the bird perspective. The isoquant lines 
(i.e. the broken lines) indicate all environmental pressure – total cost combinations that can 
produce the indicated output quantity.  
{Table 2 around here} 
{Figure 1 around here} 
Since points A, B, and C lie on the isoquants corresponding to the output level of the goods, 
all three goods are classified as efficient. For each of these points, there exist positive prices for 
environmental pressures at which these points will yield the maximum value added. Thus all 
three points are classified as eco-efficient (and hence belong in group 1a). Hypothetical goods of 
group 1b) would be located on the vertical parts of the isoquants of Figure 1. 
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Next, consider the classification of observations D and E. Both these observations lie in the 
interior of the level set for Y = 4, and are therefore classified as inefficient. The arrows indicate 
the direction in which these points will be projected to the frontier; however, the reference points 
suggested by this isoquant map are not fully accurate due to the effect of the scaling variable θ  
(i.e., the shadow price of the inactivity constraint). For good D, the shadow price of the 
environmental pressure is positive, and thus, good D is classified  as inefficient but 
environmental friendly product. For good E, the shadow price of the environmental pressure will 
be zero, and therefore, good E is classified as inefficient, environmentally harmful good.  
More generally, let us consider a hypothetical inefficient observation whose output level is 
4. We can see from Figure 1 that the shadow price of the environmental pressure will be positive 
if the environmental pressure falls within range [1.333, 6]. If the environmental pressure is higher 
than 6, its shadow price will be set equal to zero.  
 
5. Extensions and modifications 
Thus far we have assumed that the total operating costs C are known, and we have normalized 
the “shadow price” of cost Ck as one. This is a natural choice since costs are measured in money, 
and the data about the operating costs is usually readily available. By contrast, the economic 
prices of the services Y and environmental pressures Z are typically unknown. Our choice of cost 
Ck as the numeraire has been mainly guided by the data availability in a typical application.  
Of course, if the price of some specific input or output (or even the price of certain 
environmental pressure) is known, we could choose it as the numeraire instead of the operating 
cost. The practical implementation of such alternative normalizations in problem (3) is rather 
straightforward, and will not be discussed in more detail here. On the other hand, even if all 
prices (and costs) are unknown (which is sometimes the case), it may be useful to select one 
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output or input as a numeraire commodity, and express all prices in terms of this numeraire. The 
absolute interpretation of the eco-efficiency is then conditional upon the specific price value for 
that selected commodity.
12
In the presented method, the only restriction for prices of outputs and environmental 
pressures is that they have to be nonnegative. As a consequence, the primal problem (3) allows 
for rather extreme pricing scenarios. For example, a certain product can be considered eco-
efficient, although its output prices may become unrealistically high by virtue of optimization. 
Therefore, if we have some a priori information concerning true prices, in some situations it can 
be reasonable to impose price or domain restrictions on the admissible prices, as in the weight-
restricted DEA approaches.
13  
Price restrictions can usually be set either on objective or subjective grounds. It is worth 
emphasizing that the absolute shadow prices suggested above also enable us to impose absolute 
price restrictions of the form  mm u m α β ≤≤, which restricts the price of environmental pressure m 
to the closed interval [ ] , mm α β . We note that this contrasts with the usual DEA practice, which 
typically do not employ absolute weight restrictions (see Dyson et al., 2001, for discussion). 
From the perspective of policy maker the absolute restrictions are usually more accessible and 
transparent than relative restrictions, since lower and upper bounds have a more meaningful 
interpretation. Furthermore, it is rather easy to include absolute weight restrictions to the 
presented framework. Although absolute price restrictions are more meaningful, conventional 
relative price restrictions can be used as well. The latter can be especially useful if we only have 
information concerning the ratio of prices available for the analysis.  
One alternative modification to the presented approach is to change the reference group in 
(3) so that the evaluated good cannot be compared with itself. Such adjustment would be directly 
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analogous with the super-efficiency approach by Andersen and Petersen (1993). In the super-
efficiency approach, the eco-efficiency measure indicates how well consumer durable k performs 
relative to its best competitor (i.e. the best other product). The value is positive, if product k 
performs better than its best competitor at the given optimal prices. The value is negative, if its 
value added is lower than that of any other product. The advantages of this approach include the 
following: (1) it is possible to measure the comparative advantage of the efficient products and 
(2) it is possible to find unique shadow prices also for the efficient products. On the other hand, 
the important problem related to super-efficiency approach is that in the primal problem prices 
can go up to infinity such that the solution of the primal problem is also infinite. This problem 
results from the form of the model: since the comparison product is not included in the reference 
group, it is possible that the linear programming problem cannot be solved. However, if the 
super-efficiency approach has a finite optimal solution, its shadow prices can in some situations 
provide further complementary information. 
 
6. Illustrative Application  
6.1. Setting 
In this section we demonstrate how the presented approach can be applied to the real-world case 
of eco-efficiency assessment of car models. Generally, automobiles are extremely differentiated 
products, since many characteristics vary considerably among different brands and models. 
Therefore, it is not meaningful to compare cars that differ heavily with respect to their technology 
and product characteristics. To guarantee sufficient homogeneity we will focus on evaluating 
eco-efficiency of Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs) that can generally be considered as fairly 
homogeneous products.  
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A number of earlier studies have employed DEA for evaluating efficiency or performance 
of products, and some of these studies have assessed efficiency of cars (e.g. Papahristodoulou, 
1997; Fernandez-Castro and Smith, 2002 and Staat, Bauer and Hammerschmidt, 2002). To the 
best of our knowledge, however, earlier DEA product evaluation studies have not paid attention 
to the environmental burden generated by the products. This is quite surprising given that private 
automobiles are major contributors to the global green-house effect, transboundary acidification 
problem, particle emissions, and smog formation. Besides pollutants and emissions, car traffic 
also creates other notable side-effects such as noise. Together, all these different environmental 
effects present a great challenge for the evaluation of environmental pressures and further, eco-
efficiency.  
The main purpose of this application is to demonstrate how the presented approach can be 
used for eco-efficiency evaluation in practice. From an environmental point of view, one of the 
most interesting issues is whether the gasoline and diesel engine vehicles differ with respect to 
their environmental performance. Hence, we examine the effect of engine type on the eco-
efficiency of SUVs. Second important aim is to compare our approach to more traditional DEA 
methods based on relative shadow prices. For this purpose, we use the environmental efficiency 
DEA approach where emissions are modeled as negative outputs. This approach has been 
suggested by many authors (e.g. Scheel, 2001; Korhonen and Luptacik, 2004) and used in many 
environmental efficiency applications. From various environmental efficiency approaches 
presented in literature, this approach comes closest to our method. We believe that this 
comparison helps to understand differences between absolute shadow price approach and 
traditional DEA method in greater depth.  
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6.2. Data 
In accordance with our theoretical framework, the focus of the application lies on the use phase. 
Thus we have to take into account environmental pressures, economic outputs (or services) and 
costs that the use of automobiles generates. In this case, it sounds reasonable to focus on the 
marginal costs and environmental pressures associated with a one kilometer drive with the 
vehicle.  
Our data set is based on the database of the Finnish Vehicle Administration (AKE),
14 and it 
includes the total of 88 different models from 8 different manufacturers (Chevrolet, Hyundai, 
Jeep, Land Rover, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Suzuki and Toyota). From these, 49 are gasoline engine 
and 39 diesel engine vehicles. The data are based on the technical inspections carried out by AKE 
before a model is approved a sales license in Finland (every approved model must meet certain 
criteria related to safety and emissions). Although the database covers the most important 
economic and environmental variables, many important characteristics related to safety and 
comfort are not available. 
To a large extent, the economic value of safety and comfort features depends on motorists’ 
subjective perceptions, which are difficult to quantify and evaluate objectively. Here, we do not 
cover indicators for immaterial benefits associated with owning and driving a car, but focus 
exclusively on its primary transportation function. For comparison, we assume that all SUV 
models are driven at the same speed to transport the same (unspecified) load of passengers and 
cargo, which is less than the maximum capacity of any of the vehicles. As a consequence, our 
analysis includes only one output, the mileage, which has the same value (1 km) for all vehicles. 
The value of all the benefits per one kilometer of transportation service is represented by the 
output price p. Since the economic value can differ considerably across competing vehicles, 
output price p is treated as an unknown variable.  
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In order to calculate absolute efficiency scores and absolute shadow prices, we have to fix a 
certain price or total costs. In this application, it is natural to measure efficiency with respect to 
costs (i.e. fix the price of total economic costs), because information about costs or input prices is 
readily available. Given our focus on the transportation function, the total economic cost will in 
this case consist of the fuel costs. Since we compare efficiency of the gasoline and diesel engine 
vehicles from the social point of view, we use tax-free prices both for gasoline and diesel fuels. 
This is because the retail prices of fuels already include taxes that are (at least partly) motivated 
by environmental policy arguments. Therefore, fuel costs were calculated by multiplying the 
average fuel consumption (l/km) by the price of 0.52 Euro per liter for gasoline vehicles and by 
0.54 Euro per liter for diesel vehicles, which were the prevailing tax-free (fuel) prices in Finland 
at the time of the analysis. 
We accounted for five different environmental pressure categories: climate change, 
acidification, smog formation, dispersion of particles and noise. From various green house gases, 
the data include carbon monoxide (CO) and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. In the analysis, 
these form the climate change category. Other environmental pressures, on the other hand, are 
only represented by one emission or burden: nitrogen oxides NOx (gram/km) for acidification, 
hydrocarbons HC (gram/km) for smog formation, total particulate matter TPM for dispersion of 
particles and the noise level (dB) in the speed of 50 km/hour for the noise variable. Descriptive 
statistics of environmental pressures and total costs are provided in Table 3. 
{Table 3 around here} 
Before presenting and discussing the results, it is worth emphasizing that the sample of 
SUV models and their associated data represent the situation in Finland. The fuel prices differ 
across countries, and also the vehicles themselves are adapted to the technical requirements of the 
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market area. For these reasons, the results that follow do not directly apply to SUV markets in 
other countries.       
 
6.3. Results and Discussion 
We calculated efficiency scores for all 88 different models by using absolute shadow price 
approach. For the comparison, we also estimated efficiency scores with the environmental 
efficiency DEA approach where environmental pressures were modeled as negative outputs.   
Interestingly, since the fuel costs and all environmental pressures are measured per 1 kilometer, 
which is simultaneously the value of (desirable) output, the DEA model is invariant to the returns 
to scale (RTS) specification; all alternative RTS specifications yield exactly the same results. 
The proportion of eco-efficient models is relatively high: 28 SUV models in our sample 
proved efficient in terms of both methods. According to our method and the classification of 
goods proposed in Section 3, from these 28 efficient vehicles, 24 models were eco-efficient 
(group 1a), and only 4 were considered as weakly efficient (group 1b). If any of the 
environmental pressures is assigned a positive price, these four models will become inefficient. 
Total of 59 models were classified as inefficient. Moreover, 44 models could be classified as 
inefficient and environmental friendly (group 2a) as they had at least one positive environmental 
shadow price. Further, 15 models were classified both inefficient and environmentally harmful 
(group 2b) as these models received zero shadow prices for all environmental pressures. 
Table 4 reports the efficiency scores for the ten least efficient SUVs. For these ten models, 
the rank correlation of the absolute and relative DEA efficiency measures is equal to one, and for 
all models the correlation is 0.982. Interestingly, for certain brands all models proved to be 
inefficient. For example, all 6 different models of CHEVROLET TAHOE are inefficient, and 
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even among the ten most inefficient models as seen also from Table 4. Other examples including 
only inefficient models are JEEP Wrangler and JEEP Grand Cherokee.  
{Table 4 around here} 
Consider the efficiency score of the most inefficient model in our analysis (i.e. LAND 
ROVER Range Rover 4.4 V8 Vogue A). The value of -4.57 means that this model has at least 
4.57 Euros higher costs per 100 kilometers than the efficient reference model. This inefficiency 
premium sounds surprisingly high, given that it only represents an upper bound (or the most 
optimistic estimate) for true efficiency. The results of the DEA are parallel to those of the 
absolute shadow price method, although the interpretation of the efficiency measure is different. 
According to the DEA method, the most inefficient models have reduction potential over 50% in 
costs, achievable through efficiency improvements while keeping the mileage and environmental 
pressures at the present levels. Of course, our analysis does not take into account capital costs or 
immaterial benefits of car ownership (such as the prestige value of owning a V8-engine SUV). 
Nonetheless, these results clearly indicate that there are remarkable differences between different 
SUV models as far as eco-efficiency in their primary transportation function is concerned. 
For comparison, we also calculated efficiency scores using two other DEA approaches. In 
the first DEA approach, the environmental pressures were modeled as traditional inputs. In the 
second approach, the fuel costs were treated as negative outputs and environmental pressures as 
inputs. Both these specifications gave as many as 61 efficient SUVs in total.
15 At least in the 
present setting, these two approaches had much weaker discriminating power that the two 
approaches presented in Table 4. 
We observe from Table 4 that the ten least efficient vehicles all had gasoline engines. We 
next examine if there are systematic differences in environmental performance of gasoline and 
diesel vehicles. To eliminate other possible effects (such as the safety and comfort features), we 
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focus attention on the subset SUV models which are available with either gasoline or diesel 
engine. Our data set includes 18 pairs of models with identical features, except for the engine 
type. For both these groups, we use the full sample of 88 models as the reference group. The 
efficiency measures of these 36 models are reported in Table 5.  
{Table 5 around here} 
From the 18 pairs presented in Table 5, only in one case gasoline vehicle proved out to be 
more inefficient than the corresponding diesel engine vehicle. Yet more interesting are the 
remarkable differences in certain pairs. For example, the three TOYOTA Land Cruisers are 
efficient for diesel models, whereas corresponding gasoline vehicles produce 2.75 Euros higher 
costs per 100 kilometers than their efficient reference models. The average difference between 
gasoline and diesel vehicles is also quite high: according to the results gasoline vehicles generate 
about 1.1 Euros higher costs per 100 kilometers than the diesel engine counterparts. Although 
these results are merely suggestive, they seem to indicate that diesel engine SUVs are more 
environmental friendly than the gasoline engine SUVs. Definitive conclusions would yet require 
a more detailed analysis concerning the economic benefits and costs. In any case, this kind of 
analysis could be used for assessing whether the use of diesel vehicles should be encouraged by 
the government, and for designing efficient policy instruments. 
Thus far we have only considered the efficiency scores and the effect of the engine type 
on the scores. However, it is also important to investigate the absolute shadow prices given by the 
presented method in more detail. Table 6 reports descriptive statistics concerning the optimal 
shadow prices of environmental pressures concerning all vehicles. Interestingly, the shadow 
prices of climate change are zero for all but one model. By contrast, prices for smog formation 
and noise are positive for over half of the SUV models.  
{Table 6 around here} 
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To understand how these shadow prices are determined, it is illustrative to consider the 
evaluation from the perspective of strategic competition between alternative models. Since 
assigning a positive price on an environmental pressure will always decrease the economic net 
benefit of the evaluated model, models that perform poorly on environmental criteria will assign 
zero prices for those criteria. Only those models that perform well (in relative terms) on some 
environmental criterion assign a positive price for an environmental pressure, because this will 
give them a comparative advantage relative to competing models. For example, all 11 LAND 
ROVER Freelander models with a diesel engine assign a positive price for smog formation. A 
closer inspection of the data shows that these models indeed have notably lower hydrocarbon 
emissions compared to other models. Similarly, five (out of 6) NISSAN models and seven (out of 
10) TOYOTA models have a positive price for noise. These models have lower noise levels than 
their competitors. In conclusion, if a model assigns a high shadow price for an environmental 
pressure, it must perform relatively well in this criterion compared to its competitors. 
The fact that all models assign the price of zero for the climate change criterion is not 
surprising. Indeed, Kortelainen and Kuosmanen (2004) made a similar finding in their more 
general level eco-efficiency analysis of Finnish road transportation using municipal level data 
and more traditional DEA techniques. Kortelainen and Kuosmanen suggest that the detrimental 
effects of greenhouse gases have been acknowledged relatively recently, and the car 
manufacturers have not yet had time to reduce these emissions. Moreover, there are no simple 
technical solutions for reduction of greenhouse gases. By contrast, noise and smog formation 
have attracted public attention already for a longer period of time, and this has had a notable 
influence on the automobile industry. This may explain why many SUV models find competitive 
advantage in smog formation and noise criteria, while none of the evaluated models shows 
distinct advantage in climate change.  
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It should be emphasized that although zero shadow price are possible in our method, the 
same issue concerns other DEA and activity analysis approaches presented in literature. To 
estimate more realistic absolute prices in this context, additional price constraints could be 
included into primal problem (3), as discussed in Section 3.  
To conclude, the purpose of this application was to illustrate how the proposed approach 
for eco-efficiency analysis of consumer durables can be employed in practice. We found that the 
efficiency measure has a compelling economic interpretation, and that absolute prices enable its 
direct assessment. Eco-efficiency analysis of automobiles is a fascinating topic that certainly 
warrants further empirical analysis. A more systematic empirical study could try to quantify the 
economic benefits and costs more precisely, accounting for capital costs and possibly certain 
subjective factors such as safety and comfort and some immaterial benefits such as the prestige 
value of a car.  
 
7. Conclusions 
We have presented a new approach for analyzing eco-efficiency of consumer durables by using 
DEA. Conceptually, our setting is most closely related to the product evaluation approaches of 
DEA literature. In contrast to the earlier studies, however, we considered the measurement 
problem from the policy maker’s point of view taking into account environmental pressures 
generated by products.  
From a technical perspective, an important difference to previous studies was our solution 
to measure efficiency in absolute monetary terms using prices expressed in absolute units of 
measurement. In the presented method, the efficiency score indicates the minimum monetary loss 
that the usage of one service of the evaluated consumer durable can offer compared to the best 
product in the reference group. We believe that measuring efficiency in terms of absolute scale 
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shadow prices is a very useful innovation in general, and this paper is one of the first studies to 
explore that route.
16  
In the presented approach, the efficiency score of a certain product is calculated at the most 
favorable prices and therefore, represents the upper bound for the true efficiency. As a result, the 
efficiency score may become too favorable, if non-negativity is the only constraint for prices. On 
the other hand, it is easy to include both absolute and relative price restrictions when additional 
price information is available. In fact, the essential advantage of our approach is the possibility to 
impose absolute restrictions, which, by contrast, cannot be used in the context of traditional DEA.  
The proposed approach was applied to the eco-efficiency evaluation of Sport Utility 
Vehicles, with the main purpose of demonstrating the application of the method in practice. We 
calculated the efficiency scores by using the presented approach and more traditional DEA 
methods and compared the results given by these approaches. In addition, we examined the 
differences in eco-efficiency between gasoline and diesel engine vehicles. We conclude that a 
full-scale empirical eco-efficiency analysis of automobiles would provide a fascinating area of 
future research. 
Another promising field for study would be to apply the presented method to project 
evaluation when a number of alternative project designs are available. Indeed, our approach lies 
very close to the environmental Cost-Benefit analysis (CBA), where economic benefits and costs 
of alternative policies or projects are compared with each other in an absolute scale. Applying the 
insights of the present paper, one could conduct an environmental CBA assessment without 
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Notes 
1.  Of course, it would be possible to compare products in terms of their utilization of recyclable materials and 
components and the content of harmful substances (such as mercury). 
2.  Life-cycle analysis (LCA) is the most standardized method for assessing environmental performance of 
products. Despite its popularity, LCA has some significant weaknesses. The most essential problem is that the 
method does not account for economic benefits and costs; it solely concentrates on the measurement of 
environmental pressures or impacts. Another disadvantage is that there is no general methodology within the 
LCA that would allow one to aggregate different environmental pressures into a single damage index. 
Therefore, LCA studies have typically assumed arbitrary weights for aggregation of various environmental 
pressures.  
3.  Practically, activity analysis and Data Envelopment Analysis are nearly similar methods; only their 
perspectives are a bit different (see Färe and Grosskopf, 2002, for a technical comparison of methods).  
  27 
4.  Färe, Grosskopf and Nelson (1990) presented the idea of absolute shadow price in the context of price 
efficiency, but did not utilize it for efficiency measurement.      
5.  To a certain extent, forests are capable of sequestrating the extra carbon-dioxide emitted to the atmosphere. 
The problem occurs when the green house gas emissions exceed the carrying capacity of the ecosystem, and 
extra carbon-dioxide stocks begin to accumulate causing drastic, unpredictable changes in climate conditions. 
6.  For clarity, we prefer to use the term “pressure” instead of “potential impact”. 
7.  Toxic pesticide applied in agriculture is example of such substances that can cause different types of pressures 
and risks for farm-workers, consumers, and to the eco-system. As a consequence, substances of this kind 
should be accounted for in several pressure indicators. 
8.  Other economic instruments for internalizing the externality include pollution charges/taxes, emission 
abatement subsidies, liability payments, and non-compliance fees (see e.g. Perman et al. (2003), Ch. 7, for 
further discussion). 
9.  Note that, strictly speaking, the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics requires consumers’ 
preferences to be locally non-satiated. (This implies that there has to be at least one desirable service or 
output.) 
10.  The assumptions required by second fundamental welfare theorem include consumers’ monotone and convex 
preferences are firms’ convex production sets. 
11.  The proof of the dual expression is available from the authors by request. 
12.  See Kuosmanen et. al (2005) for further discussion about the normalization. 
13.  This issue of imposing additional a priori weight bounds has attracted considerable attention in the DEA 
literature (see e.g. Allen et al., 1997; Pedraja-Chaparro, Salinas-Jimenez and Smith (1997), for reviews). 
14.  http://www.ake.fi/index_e.asp
15.  Korhonen and Luptacik (2004) present these DEA approaches and also the DEA approach presented in Table 
4 and compare their properties.  
16.   In addition to environmental performance measurement, absolute shadow prices can be especially useful, for 
example, in the context of profit efficiency analysis: see Kuosmanen et. al (2005). 
17.   For further discussion about the application of DEA to environmental CBA, we refer to Kuosmanen and 
Kortelainen (2004). 
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Table 1. Relationship between some environmental pressures and undesirable outputs  
Undesirable outputs  Environmental pressure  Unit of measurement 
CO2, CH4, N2O, CO   Climate change  Tons of CO2 equivalents 
NOx, SO2 Acidification  Tons of acid equivalents 
Hydrocarbons (HC)  Smog formation  Tons of HC 
Total Particulate Matter (TPM)  Dispersion of particles  Tons of TPM 
Sound waves  Noise  Decibels (dB) 
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Table 2. Numerical example with 5 products, 1 output, 1 environmental pressure and total cost 
variable 
 Y  C  Z 
A  6 10 2 
B  8 4  12 
C  10 13 13 
D  4 6 4 
E  4 3.5 8 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std.  dev. Min. Max. 
Economic costs (€/100 km)  5.53 1.11 3.80 8.42 
Climate change (g/100 km)  26299.29 4752.38 17455.70 39097.20 
Acidification (g/100 km)  25.08 24.41 0.10 72.60 
Smog formation (g/100 km)  5.24 4.18 0.00 23.50 
Dispersion of particles (ppm)  0.03 0.03 0.005 0.08 
Noise (dB)  72.70 1.76 68 76 
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 Table 4. Eco-efficiency scores, the 10 most inefficient SUVs  





88  LAND ROVER Range Rover 4.4 V8 Vogue A  gasoline  -4.57  0.46
87  JEEP Grand Cherokee 4.7 V8 A5 Overland  gasoline  -4.47  0.46




85  CHEVROLET TAHOE LT  gasoline  -3.59  0.51
84  CHEVROLET TAHOE LT PREMIUM  gasoline  -3.59  0.51
83  CHEVROLET TAHOE LS  gasoline  -3.59  0.51
82  CHEVROLET TAHOE LT PREMIUM 7 H.  gasoline  -3.53  0.52
81  CHEVROLET TAHOE LT 7 H.  gasoline  -3.53  0.52
80  CHEVROLET TAHOE LS 7 H.  gasoline  -3.53  0.52
79  JEEP Wrangler 4.0 A4 Sport  gasoline                    -3.42  0.53
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Table 5. Comparison of gasoline and diesel engine SUVs 












HYUNDAI Santa Fe GLS 5d A/C  2.4  2.0 CRDi 
VGT  -1.300 -0.137  -1.163
HYUNDAI Santa Fe GLS 5d AA/C 
AT 
2.7 V6   2.0 CRDi 
VGT  -1.155 0.000  -1.155
JEEP Grand Cherokee A5   4.7 V8   2.7 CRD  -4.472 -1.370  -3.102
LAND ROVER Freelander E  2.5 V6  2.0 Td4  0.000 0.000  0.000
LAND ROVER Freelander HSE  2.5 V6  2.0 Td4  0.000 0.000  0.000
LAND ROVER Freelander S  2.5 V6  2.0 Td4  0.000 0.000  0.000
LAND ROVER Freelander SE  2.5 V6  2.0 Td4  0.000 0.000  0.000
LAND ROVER Freelander Sport   2.5 V6  2.0 Td4  0.000 0.000  0.000
LAND ROVER Freelander Sport 
hardback 
2.5 V6  2.0 Td4 
0.000 0.000  0.000
LAND ROVER Range Rover 
Vogue A 
4.4 V8  3.0 Td6 
-4.569 -2.065  -2.504





-3.588 -1.666  -1.922
MITSUBISHI Pajero Sport Instyle 
AT 
3.0 V6  - 
-2.695 -1.608  -1.087
NISSAN X-TRAIL Sport 4x4  2.5  2.2 dCi 136  -0.266 -0.092  -0.174
SUZUKI Grand Vitara 4WD 5d AC  2  2,0 Tdi  -0.991 -0.146  -0.845




2.0 TDi  
0.000 -0.349  0.349
TOYOTA Land Cruiser Executive 
8h aut. 
4.0 V6   3.0 D-4D  
-2.749 0.000  -2.749





-2.749 0.000  -2.749




3.0 D-4D  
-2.749 0.000  -2.749
Average     -1.516 -0.413  -1.103
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Environmental Pressure  Average price (€)  Standard deviation 
of shadow prices (€) 
Number of models  
with positive price 
Climate change  0.000 (€/g)  0.000  1 
Acidification 0.077  (€/g)  0.414  6 
Smog formation  0.257 (€/g)  0.525  48 
Dispersion of particles  0.099 (€/ppm)  0.263  14 
Noise 0.002  (€/dB)  0.003  52 
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Figure 1. Isoquant Map of the Numerical Example  
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